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PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHTS AGAINST MUNICIPALITIES IN
KENTUCKY
By HARLAND J. SCARBOwROUGH
Before discussing the Kentucky decisions on this question it
may be well to state that judicial judgments in this country are
not in harmony upon the question as to whether the rights of
municipalities or of the public may be lost by non-user and ad-
verse possession. Also we should note that while some of the
courts do not hold that the statutes of limitation are a bar to an
action by a municipality, yet these same courts hold that non-
user may continue so long, and consequently private rights may
grow up of such a nature, as to create or to amount to an equit-
able estoppel or an estoppel in pais,1 which these courts will
enforce as a matter of right or justice; while other courts have
emphatically denied the applicability of such doctrine to public
rights. By the great weight of authority, niullatm tempus accur-
rit regi applies to the sovereign power, and the United States as
well as the several states are not, without express provisions,
bound by the statutes of limitations.
There is a pretty general agreement in the decisions that
the statutes of limitations will run against the municipalities
as to property held by them in their proprietary or private rights
as distinct from their public or governmental capacity;2 but the
general doctrine is that no title by adverse possession can be
acquired against a city as to property which it holds for a public
use, such, for example, as its streets. The ruling being that the
city is the mere trustee for the public; that cities cannot author-
ize the erection of obstructions in the public streets; that un-
authorized obstructions or structures thereon are public
nuisances and that no length of time can, unless there be a limit
by statute, legalize a public nuisance; that if this were not so
public rights would be gradually frittered away, there being no
one sufficiently interested to exercise the vigilance necessary to
IC$y of Uniontown v. Berry, 24 Ky. L. R. 1672.2 fMetropolitan Railway Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U. S. 1;
Bamnoc. County v. Bell, 8 Idaho 1, 6(5 Pacific 710; Platt Co. v. GoodZell,
87 Ill. 84; Lancaster Co. v. Brinthall, 29 Pa. 38; Evans v. Erie County,
66 Pa. St. 222; Kearney v. Westchester Borough, 199 Pa. St. 392.
KENTUCKY LAW JOuRNAL
protect the public interest; since in many instances there would
be a lack of public official watchfulness, and individuals would be
too slightly interested to make objections, preferring rather to
tolerate encroachment upon public property than to dispute the
right of their neighbors.
In an Ohio decision3 Judge Minshall, C. J., said: "The
general rule is that the statute of limitation does not apply as
a bar to the rights of the public unless expressly named in the
statutes, for the reason that the same active vigilance cannot be
expected of it as is known to characterize that of a private
person always jealous of his rights and prompt to repel any
invasion of them." The earlier cases4 in Ohio which seem to have
held a contrary doctrine may be put upon the ground of estop-
pel. Illinois allows estoppel in pais although it refuses to ac-
cept the doctrine that the statutes of limitations run against the
city. The early decisions of West Virginia allowed the statutes
of limitations to run against the city, but a later decision5 ex-
pressly overruled the doctrine and even went further and denied
that equitable estoppel could be urged against the city. But
while the foregoing is the general rule as applied in most states,
the contrary rule is held in Arkansas, Kentucky, Michigan, and
in a form modified by statutes in Massachusetts, Connecticut and
New York. Up until 1873 the decisions in Kentucky show that
the statutes of limitations may run against the municipality
practically the same as against individuals. In the case of
Rowan's Executors v. Town. of Portland' the question arose in
the situation where the owner of land had recorded a plat of it,
dedicating the same to the town of Portland on the Ohio river,
later adversely occupied by it by constructing a wharf and charg-
ing toll for wharf privileges. The court held that he might thus
gain title against the city by adverse possession. This decision
announced the rule that had been followed in Kentucky until
the legislature in 1873 passed the act7 providing that before
possession of a street or alley shall be deemed adverse, the party
3 Heddleston v. Hendricks, 52 0. S. 460, 465.
4 Cincinnati v. First Presbyterian Church, 8 Oh. 299; Cincinnati v.
Evans, 5 0. S. 594.
sRalston v. Weston, 46 W. Va. 544.
'8 B. Mon. 232.T Ky. Statutes, 2546.
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must give written notice to the municipal authorities that
his holding is adverse. Other cases supporting the doctrine
may be found in the note below.8  The case of City of
Henderson v. Yeaman, et al.,9 was an action to quiet title
to a strip of land appropriated by the plaintiff's grantor
to and claimed by the city of Henderson to have been dedicated
as a street, if not a street at the time of the appropriation the
right to claim it by adverse possession, and it was held that it
was controlled by Kentucky Statutes, section 2505, providing
that an action for the recovery of real property must be brought
within fifteen years after the right to institute it first accrued to
the plaintiff or to the person for whom he claims. The case
holds that where a street was set apart and dedicated as a pub-
lic way when the town was laid out, the fact that the city did not
take actual physical possession of, or control or improve the
street or that it was not used by the public, will not work an
abandonment of the street or affect the city's right to reclaim it
against an adverse holder without some affirmative act by the
city manifesting a purpose to abandon. In Bosworth v. City of
Mt. Sterling, supra, it was held that the act of 1873, supra, re-
quired written notice from the person in possession of any street
or alley to the town council that his possession is adverse in
order to start the running of the statutes of limitations, applies
to those in possession of any street at the time of its passage if
the possession had not then ripened into title. A city cannot
recover a strip of land enclosed and occupied by defendants for
twenty years, during which time the city has paved in front of
the strip and made no claim to it, thereby recognizing defendant's
title. It was held in Hegan, et al. v. Pendennis Club, et al.,'0 that
where an alley dedicated for the common use to lots abutting
thereon had been adversely used by the owner of one of the lots
for more than forty years, the right of the city and the other
owner was barred by the statutes of limitations and that Ken-
tucky Statutes, section 210, providing that all sales or convey-
8 Dudley v. Trustees of Frankfort, etc., 12 B. Mon. 610; Alves Exec-
utors and Heirs v. Town of Henderson, 16 B. Mon. 131; Bosworth v.
City of Mt. Sterling, 12 Ky. L. R. 157, 13 S. W. 920; Terrill v. Blooml-
field, 14 Ky. L. R. 614, 21 S. W. 1041.
p169 Ky. 503, 184 S. W. 878.1023 Ky. L. R. 861, 84 S. W. 464.
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ances of any lands of which any other person has adverse posses-
sion shall be null and void, does not apply to conveyances of
private passways and easements though section 458 provides
that the word "land" shall be construed to mean "land, tene-
ments, hereditaments and all rights thereto and interest therein
other than a chattel interest." Moody-Mitchcll Imonher and
Building Company v. City of Louisville,1 held that since plain-
tiff had not complied with statutes, section 2546, and prede-
cessor in title had not held adversely that palintiff's possession
was not adverse. In Cornwall, et al. v. City of Louisville,12 a
designated portion of land was ceded to a city for the use of a
railroa company on a condition that no more land was to be
taken for that purpose. Afterward the company instituted a
proceeding under the statute to have additional land condemned,
and it was held that while the right of eminent domain cannot
be impaired by any private contract, the court should prescribe
such terms as w6uld insure to the property owner a just compen-
saton for the land ceded under the contract. When a person has
been permitted to remain in continuous adverse and active pos-
session of a public street for more than thirty years the title
vests absolutely in him.
In Home Laundry Company, et at. v. City of Louisville, et
al.,' 3 involving the situation in which in 1851 the general council
of a city adopted a resolution authorizing -a mayor to give eight
feet of the city land in the rear of the court house lot for public
use provided the owners of property on the north side of such
strip would dedicate eight feet for public use and provided the
street was only to be used by pedestrians and not for wagons,
carts and drays. The city as a private owner of property and
the other abutting property owners thereupon executed a deed
dedicating such strip as a street denominated "Court Place"
with no provision that it was to be used by pedestrians only.
There was no formal acceptance by ordinance of the general
council, but the city as a governmental entity took charge and
control of such place and improved it at the cost of the abutting
owners, including the city, paved it as a sidewalk or passage and
- 169 Ky. 237, 183 S. W. 481.
87 Ky. 72, 7 S. W. 553.
- 168 Ky. 499, 182 S. W. 645.
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thereafter for many years its use was limited to pedestrians and
neither the public nor abutting property owners used it as a car-
riage way. The court said that "It is, however, the law of this
jurisdiction that a municipality or the public may acquire the
right to the use of a street by adverse use, and having acquired
the right to use the street may lose it by the adverse use of an-
other. The municipality in its governmental capacity holds the
street in the nature of a trustee for the public and the public
may acquire easement in a street through the action of the muni-
cipal authorities for the benefit of the public, or by adverse use
by the public for the statutory period. Upon the other hand, an
individual may by adverse possession for the statutory period
of lands dedicated to the public use, acquire title to them ...
The principle allowing the acquisition in streets by adverse user
of the public and the law of such easements by the public by
adverse possession of another over the street dedicatcd to the
public use remains unchanged except for the statutes of 1873,
which provide that the statutes of limitations would not begin to
ran in favor of an individual against a town or city for the use
or possesson of a street until the party whose rights or interests
to rely upon such adverse possession of it has given the author-
ities of the municipality notice of his intentions.'4 The peculiar
rights of an abutting property owner for the use of a street for
ingress and egress to and from the property with teams and ve-
hicles is a private right of his own and one not shared by the
public with him, and the municipality does not hold such right
as a trustee for him, hence, it is a right which he may lose by ad-
verse use under circumstances which justify the enforcement of
that doctrine, hence, when the municipality in 1853 accepted the
dedication of 'Court Place' for public use as a street for pedes-
trians only, and was so taken control of by the municipal au-
thorities and so constructed as to constitute notice to the
public and to every one, that its use was limited to pedestrains
as the street in the nature of a sidewalk and not the use
of vehicles, the abutting property owners then had the right
to enforce the conditions of the dedication and to require its
construction in such a way that it could be used as an authorized
1 Ky. S., 1915, 2546.
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street over which they could use vehicles. . . The action
of the municipality in constructing and holding the street as a
sidewalk for pedestrians only and the use made of it by the
public of such was open, visible, notorious, continuous -and neces-
sarily adverse and hostile to the claim of an easement by the
abutting property owners to drive teams and vehicles over it.
When a municipality through it officers and agents takes and
holds lands for a street adversely to the rights of an owner in
fee for the statutory period accompanied by the use of it by the
public in the manner necessary to create an easement by prescrip-
tion in the street, the title to its use as a street becomes fully
vested in the public. The physical characteristics of such street
and the manner of such construction of its use having been a no-
tice to eachl succeeding abutting pioperty owner to the use to
which it was limited, one designing to acquire property on it
could not have been misled as to the use which he could make
of it and was estopped to complain that he was not permitted to
use it for vehicles."
In City of Franklin v. St. Mary's Roman Catholic Churchl15
the city had dedicated certain land to the use of a cemetery and
had marked certain portions of same for the use of the Catholic
church, and while the testimony was conflicting as to its being
set apart for the Catholic church, the court held the evidence to
establish title in the Catholic church gained by adverse posses-
sion of that certain portion of land claimed by it and that the
failure to orally assert adverse title would not prevent acquisi-
tion of same, because acts and conduct and not conversaton will
establish adverse possession, although oral assertion of such title
would be admissible; and it was therefore held that the church
would be entitled to all such property as it gained title to by ad-
verse possession even though, by reason of the small number of
Catholics in the community, only a part thereof was or could be
needed for burial purposes. Public property and lands belong-
ing to a municipality may be acquired by adverse possession save
as precluded by statute, and notwithstanding Kentucky Statutes,
section 2546, limitations run against the right of a city to recover
title to a portion of a cemetery held adversely, the term easement
188 Ky. 161, 221 S. W. 503.
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meaning the right in the land of another which cannot exist
in favor of a person in lands which he himself owns, and does not
include lands owned by a city for a cemetery.
Where notice of an adverse claim in and to a dedicated
street has not been given since the incorporation of the town
having the right to accept under deed of dedication, the statute
of limitations did not run against the town.1'
Municipal corporations may be looked upon as having a
dual capacty, one public and one private, that is, a municipal
corporation may act in its governmental capacity and it may act
in its proprietary or private capacity. The true view would,
therefore, seem to be that when a municipality acts in its govern-
mental capacity, the statutes of limitations could not run against
it. While on the other hand, if the municipality is acting with
respect to property that it does not hold for a public use, but
rather in its proprietary capacity, there is no reason why the
statutes of limitations should not run against it in reference to
this property the same as they run against a private individual.
For example, there may be pleaded against a municipality the
statutes of limitations in the case of. actions on contract or tort,
but such a corporation could not alien public streets or places,
and mere laches on its part or on the part of that of its officers
could not defeat the rights of the public by setting the statutes
to running.
There are numerous cases where it has been held that
municipalities or minor police subdivisions of the state are not
subject to limitation laws in respect to streets and public high-
ways; but streets and highways are not for the use of the inhab-
itants or any municipality or locality alone, but for the free and
unobstructed use of the people of the state. Such rights are
clearly distinguishable from the rights or interests of the inhab-
itants of a locality in property acquired for a merely local use,
such as city offices, a library site, or the use of a fire department,
where such property is held and used for strictly local purposes.
Generally there would be no difficulty in applying the stat-
utes of limitations, but the difficulty comes in those border line
". Arn v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway of Zentucky, et aL, 171 Ky.
1 7.
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cases, as we may term them, that is, in those cases where it is hard
to determine whether the municipality is acting in its govern-
mental capacity or in its proprietary or private capacity. Once
we have determined that it is acting within its governmental
capacity, the problem is really solved. This difficulty is illus-
trated by the case of Brown v. Trustees of School.17
Such circumstances in the situation as that private rights
would be acquired and the city by its failure to act allowing
these private rights to arise should be in justice and equity
estopped to deny such private rights and although the statutes of
limitations do not run in favor of the private individual against
the city, yet the city would be prohibited from asserting the
rights it once had. There is no danger in extending the prin-
ciple thus far because the city's rights will not be cut off except
in those exceptional cases where justice would demand it and
the city has been lax in the allowing of such rights to be acquired
by the private individual, and to do this would, in all cases, re-
quire the courts to decide whether in justice the city's rights
have been terminated and not leaving it to mere lapse of time;
by such the end of justice would be obtained.
1 224 I1i. 184.
